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I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes and analyzes cases regarding confessions,
searches, and seizures decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals during the past year.
Subpart II addresses confessions jurisprudence. Because there were no
significant changes in this facet of Fifth Amendment law, this article will
analyze cases decided by Texas’s courts of appeals that apply established
law to novel fact scenarios. Subpart III will examine important develop-
ments in search and seizure jurisprudence. The Supreme Court addressed
nuances related to the reasonable expectation of privacy. Additionally,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continued to clarify the law of rea-
sonable suspicion and exceptions to the warrant requirement.
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115
116 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
II. CONFESSIONS
Confessions jurisprudence stems from the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination which guarantees that “no person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”1 In the
landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that this
privilege requires the authorities to inform suspects of their right to re-
main silent, that any statement they make may be used as evidence
against them, and that they have the right to the presence of an attorney.2
These protections are also enshrined as a matter of state law in Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22.3 Miranda warnings are re-
quired whenever a person in custody is subjected to interrogation, either
in the form of express questioning or its functional equivalent.4 A defen-
dant must prove both the “custody” element and the “interrogation” ele-
ment to successfully claim that a statement is inadmissible due to a
Miranda violation.5 Article 38.22 sets several additional preconditions for
the admissibility of a defendant’s statement, including that it is electroni-
cally recorded; that it is made only after designated warnings set out in
section 2(a) are given; and that the defendant “knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily” waived the rights set out in the warnings.6
Defendants may also waive their Miranda rights if the waiver is “volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently” done.7 Voluntariness has two distinct
dimensions.8 First, relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a “free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”9 Second, the waiver must have
been made with a “full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”10 Only if
the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal
both the absence of coercion and the requisite level of comprehension
may a court properly conclude that the suspect’s Miranda rights have
been waived.11
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decided any significant confession cases during the Survey period. There-
fore, this Subpart will briefly survey cases where Texas courts of appeals
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
3. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a); see Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d
520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
4. See Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526.
5. See id.
6. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 §§ 2, 3; see Thai Ngoc Nguyen v. State,
292 S.W.3d 671, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 475.
8. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Ripkowski v.
State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).
9. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349.
10. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421; Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349.
11. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
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applied well-settled Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to novel fact
scenarios.
A. INVOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS—CASTRUITA V. STATE
In Castruita, appellant Luis Castruita made several statements to de-
tention officers while in jail awaiting trial for murder.12 On one occasion,
he met with Officer Otomi Cortez to request a cell transfer and sought to
be housed with a known gang member. During the meeting, Officer Cor-
tez asked why Castruita wanted a transfer. As part of his answer to this
question, Castruita communicated that he had shot someone who was
bothering him, and that he expected to be sentenced to no more than
twenty-five years because he was not charged with capital murder.13
These statements were later admitted into evidence at trial.14
On appeal, Castruita argued that the transfer-meeting statements were
inadmissible because they were the product of custodial interrogation
where he did not receive Miranda warnings.15 The El Paso Court of Ap-
peals decided the case under the “interrogation” requirement.16 Applying
Rhode Island v. Innis, the court of appeals noted that an interrogation
includes more than just express questioning; it also includes “any words
or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”17
But the Innis interrogation test includes a proviso: the police may ask
questions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” without making an
interrogation.18 This is generally referred to as the “booking question”
exception.19 Under the exception, questions normally attendant to “ad-
ministrative ‘booking’ procedure” do not constitute interrogation.20 To
determine whether a query is an administrative booking question, the rel-
evant inquiry is whether the question “reasonably relates to a legitimate
administrative concern, applying an objective standard.”21
The court of appeals noted that jails have a legitimate administrative
interest in segregating members of different gangs to maintain order.22
Because Castruita was asking to be housed with a known gang member,
Officer Cortez’s inquiry into why Castruita wanted to change cells was
related to the jail’s legitimate administrative concern in maintaining or-
12. Castruita v. State, No. 08-16-00030-CR, 2018 WL 3629382, at *5 (Tex. App.—El
Paso July 31, 2018, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
13. Id.
14. Id. at *3.
15. Id. at *5–6.
16. Id. at *6.
17. Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980)).
18. Id. (quoting Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
19. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 654.
20. Castruita, 2018 WL 3629382, at *6 (quoting Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 524 n.5
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
21. Id. (quoting Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659–60).
22. Id. at *7.
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der.23 This made it more like a booking question rather than an interroga-
tion designed to elicit an incriminating response.24 As such, the officer’s
questioning fell under the Innis proviso and could not be considered an
interrogation.25 The court of appeals also determined that, even if it was
an interrogation, “a statement which is unrelated to the custodial interro-
gation is not a product of the investigation, and thus is not governed by
Miranda . . . .”26 In either case, Miranda warnings were not required, so
the trial court did not err in admitting the statements.
B. SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS—GIBBS V. STATE
In Gibbs, appellant Joseph Gibbs was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to life in prison.27 After his arrest, Gibbs participated in three
custodial interrogations.28 In his first conversation with detectives, Gibbs
was read his Miranda rights then waived them by proceeding to speak
with detectives. The first conversation focused on Gibbs’s involvement in
a previous shooting.29 During this conversation, Gibbs attempted to
blame the shooting on another man, Stank.30 Officers told Gibbs that
they did not believed Stank existed and that, if he did, he did not partici-
pate in the crime.31 When Gibbs did not capitulate, the officers theorized
that Stank would be mad at Gibbs for implicating him and would
“whoop” him.32 Officers suggested that they could bring Stank into the
interrogation room to beat him up or that they could release Gibbs and
let Stank find him on his own, saying, “Brother, right now if we release
you . . . you’re dead.”33 The first conversation ended shortly afterward.
Approximately twenty-four hours later, Gibbs communicated a desire
to speak with the detectives again.34 He received another round of Mi-
randa warnings and engaged in two more conversations. In the course of
these later conversations, he admitted that he had “fucked up bad” but
did not explicitly confess to the shooting.35 At trial, Gibbs moved to sup-
press all three conversations under various theories.36 The trial court con-
cluded that, in all three interviews, appellant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights.37 It suppressed the first conversation but ad-





27. Gibbs v. State, 555 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
28. Id. at 724.
29. Id. at 724–25.




34. See id. at 724.
35. Id. at 727.
36. Id. at 732.
37. Id. at 727.
38. Id.
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Gibbs argued on appeal that, despite receiving Miranda warnings at the
beginning of each conversation, his statements to the officers were invol-
untary under the Due Process Clause.39 An accused’s confession is invol-
untary under the Due Process Clause if there was official, coercive
conduct of such a nature that the defendant’s will was “overborne” by
it.40 Gibbs asserted that the officer’s statements in the first conversation
amounted to threats of violence and bodily harm.41 These threats were
coercive police activity in that they were meant to frighten him into par-
ticipating in later interrogations.42 And because the second and third con-
versations were involuntary, the trial court erred in admitting them.43
In determining whether the detectives made credible coercive threats,
the First Houston Court of Appeals considered the totality of the circum-
stances.44 The court of appeals noted that the detectives did not believe
Stank existed and thus could not actually beat up Gibbs.45 Additionally,
the court of appeals considered the imminence of these potential
threats.46 Because the second and third conversations occurred a full day
after the close of the first conversation, the twenty-four-hour delay un-
dermined the immediacy of any threat.47 Furthermore, Gibbs was the one
who reinitiated contact after the first conversation and sought to partici-
pate in subsequent interrogations.48 These circumstances suggested either
that the detectives did not make credible threats, or alternatively, that the
threats did not have a coercive effect on Gibbs.49 Either way, the detec-
tives’ conduct was not so coercive that Gibbs’s will was “overborne” by
any police coercion.50 As such, the statements in the second and third
conversations were voluntary, and the trial court did not err by admitting
them.51
III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals “to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . .”52 In addition to protecting property interests,
39. Id. at 733–34.
40. Id. at 734 (citing Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
41. Id. at 725.
42. Id. at 735.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 736–37.
45. Id. at 737.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 822 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet.
ref’d) (“An interruption in the stream of events between the initial coercion and the con-





52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the Fourth Amendment also recognizes certain expectations of privacy.53
The U.S. Supreme Court has described this right as “essential to individ-
ual liberty.”54 While the right is undeniably important, it does embrace
some critical limitations. For example, the Amendment does not protect
every individualized expectation of privacy. Rather it only protects expec-
tations of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasona-
ble.’”55 Additionally, a person may be temporarily detained by law
enforcement officials without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if
the official maintains a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity.56 Fur-
thermore, while the Fourth Amendment generally requires the govern-
ment to obtain a search warrant before searching or seizing a person or
their affects, the warrant requirement contains its own numerous excep-
tions. This subpart will analyze recent cases addressing the limitations of
the Fourth Amendment including the reasonable expectation doctrine,
reasonable suspicion, and exceptions to the warrant requirement.
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all searches and seizures, only
unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, reasonableness is the touch-
stone for determining the constitutionality of a governmental search.57
This standard is not tied solely to an individual’s subjective expectations
of privacy. Rather, the Amendment is implicated when a defendant dem-
onstrates “an actual . . . expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”58 When an expectation of privacy is reason-
able, “official intrusion into that . . . sphere generally qualifies as a search
and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.”59 The analysis re-
garding which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection is in-
formed by historical understandings “of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was
adopted.”60 However the application of that standard is not mechanical;
the protections of the Fourth Amendment expand and adapt to fit mod-
ern realities.61 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy” standard in two important cases this year.
1. Carpenter v. United States
In Carpenter, the U.S. Supreme Court reckoned with the ability of law
enforcement to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
54. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018).
55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
56. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 536
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
57. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013).
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
59. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (citing Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
60. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
61. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14.
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of his cell phone signals.62 Those kinds of records are created when a
cellular device makes contact with wireless networks when searching for
the best available signal.63 This occurs several times a minute whenever
the signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the phone’s fea-
tures.64 Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-
stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI).65 The
government obtained CSLI data for Carpenter’s phone via court orders
issued under the Stored Communications Act, which required the gov-
ernment to show “reasonable grounds” for seeking these records.66 The
first order sought 152 days of CSLI from his service provider, MetroPCS.
The second order requested seven days of CSLI from Sprint.67 Carpenter
argued that this constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment re-
quiring the government to get a search warrant that satisfied probable
cause and not merely a court order meeting the lower burden of reasona-
ble suspicion.68
Whether CSLI is protected by the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement turns on whether cell phone owners maintain a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in these records.69 CSLI does not fit neatly under
existing precedent.70 Rather it represents a crossroads of two lines of pri-
vacy cases.71 The first line of cases “addresses a person’s expectation of
privacy in his physical location and movements.”72 The Supreme Court
began by looking at United State v. Jones, where it held that long-term
GPS monitoring of a car impinged on the expectation of privacy.73 While
CSLI data currently yields approximate physical surveillance, the court
expressed concern that the pervasive use of cell phones and the growing
concentration of cell towers could lead to near-perfect location track-
ing.74 The Supreme Court resolved the first line of inquiry by determining
that CSLI tracking shares many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring
considered in Jones in that it is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled.”75 It thus implicated the reasonable expectation of privacy in
one’s physical movement.76
The second line of cases addresses an individual’s “expectation of pri-
vacy in information conveyed to third parties.”77 Under the third-party




66. Id. at 2212 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
67. Id. at 2226.
68. Id. at 2212.
69. Id. at 2213–14.
70. Id. at 2209.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2209 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012)).
74. Id. at 2211–12.
75. Id. at 2216.
76. Id. at 2219.
77. Id. at 2209.
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doctrine, an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in informa-
tion conveyed to third parties.78 The government advocated a mechanical
application of the doctrine arguing that, because CSLI is conveyed to
third party cell-service providers, phone owners cannot assert a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.79 However, the Supreme Court declined to
follow this mechanical approach and instead focused on an underlying
rationale of the doctrine: voluntary exposure.80 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that, since cell phones create CSLI without any affirmative act by
the owner (beyond turning on the device), the conveyance of this infor-
mation to third-party providers is not truly voluntary.81 Therefore, the
expectation of privacy is not diminished.82
The Supreme Court produced a narrow decision, holding that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in seven or more days of historic-CSLI
data.83 As such, the acquisition of these records is a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the government must generally
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to seize these records from
cell-service providers.84 The Supreme Court declined to express views on
real-time CSLI, “tower dumps,” security cameras, and other business
records that might incidentally reveal location information.85
2. Byrd v. United States
In Byrd v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a federal
circuit split on the issue of whether a driver has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a rental car, even when he or she is not listed as an author-
ized driver on the rental agreement.86 Pennsylvania State Troopers
stopped a rental car driven by appellant, Terrence Byrd. The troopers
discovered that Byrd had the renter’s permission to operate the vehicle
but was not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. The
rental agreement specifically noted that permitting an unauthorized
driver to operate the vehicle violated the agreement. The troopers
searched the car and found body armor and forty-nine bricks of heroin in
the trunk. Byrd was charged with distribution and possession of heroin
with the intent to distribute and possession of body armor by a prohibited
person.87
78. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (finding no expectation of
privacy in financial records held by a bank); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (find-
ing no expectation of privacy in records of dialed telephone numbers conveyed to tele-
phone company).
79. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
80. Id. at 2219–20.
81. Id. at 2220.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2217 n.3.
84. Id. at 2221.
85. Id. at 2220.
86. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1523–24 (2018).
87. Id. at 1523.
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Before trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence found in the car,
arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that
the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful search.88 The trial court denied
the motion, concluding that because Byrd was not listed on the rental
agreement, “he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.”89
But the Supreme Court reversed.90 In reaching its decision, the Su-
preme Court emphasized the historical understanding of the Fourth
Amendment and its roots in property rights.91 Citing Rakas v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court reiterated the link between the concepts that “one of the
main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others,” and
“[o]ne who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all like-
lihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to
exclude.”92 The driver and sole occupant of a car arguably possesses it,
but whether that individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy
turns on the lawfulness of that possession.93 Because Byrd acted with the
permission of the original renter, the Supreme Court determined that he
had lawful possession of the vehicle.94 Further, the Supreme Court was
not convinced by the government’s argument that Byrd lost his expecta-
tion of privacy by violating the rental agreement.95 Here, the contract
terms had no effect on the expectations of privacy in the car.96 Resolving
the circuit split, the Supreme Court articulated a clear rule: “the mere
fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not
listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reason-
able expectation of privacy.”97
B. REASONABLE SUSPICION
Traffic stops are “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment and implicate its protections.98 “Police officers are justified in stop-
ping a vehicle when the officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that
a traffic violation has occurred.”99 During a traffic stop, the officer may
take actions that are “reasonably required to complete the mission of is-
suing a ticket for the violation.”100 This includes requesting certain infor-
mation from a driver, such as the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and
88. Id. at 1525.
89. Id. at 1523.
90. Id. at 1524.
91. Id. at 1526 (“Ever mindful of the Fourth Amendment and its history, the Court has
viewed with disfavor practices that permit ‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage
at will among a person’s private effects.’”) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345
(2009)).
92. Id. at 1527 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
93. Id. at 1529.
94. See id. at 1531.
95. See id. at 1529.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1531.
98. United States v. Williams, 804 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662 (M.D. Tenn. 2011).
99. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
100. Id. at 193 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015)).
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proof of insurance, and running a computer check on that information.101
An officer is also permitted to ask drivers and passengers about matters
unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning does “not
measurably extend the duration of the stop.”102 Once these matters are
resolved, the detention must end, and the driver must be permitted to
leave; otherwise the stop will become unlawful and evidence uncovered
by the stop will be rendered inadmissible.103 But if, during the initial stop,
an officer develops additional reasonable suspicion that the driver or an
occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, the officer may
continue questioning the individual without unlawfully prolonging the de-
tention.104 Texas courts have expressed that reasonable suspicion exists if
“the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect
that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaged in
criminal activity.”105 A reasonable suspicion determination is reviewed in
light of the totality of the circumstances.106 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals published two cases discussing reasonable suspicion during the
Survey period.
1. State v. Cortez
In Cortez, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined how a lack
of reasonable suspicion for initiating a traffic stop can invalidate a subse-
quent search.107 A State Trooper observed Jose Luis Cortez driving a
minivan down Interstate 40. The officer initiated a stop, obtained permis-
sion to search the vehicle, and found drugs in the car.108 Cortez filed a
motion to suppress the drug evidence.109
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the Trooper testified that he
stopped the minivan because he believed it had twice driven on the “fog
line” which he believed constituted a violation of Texas Transportation
Code Section 545.058(a), describing the offense of driving on an im-
proved shoulder.110 The trial court granted Cortez’s motion to suppress,
finding that (1) it was not clear from the Trooper’s dashcam video
whether Cortez’s vehicle even touched the fog line; (2) even if Cortez’s
vehicle touched the fog line, there was no proof that he crossed over the
fog line and drove on the improved shoulder; and (3) even if Cortez
drove on the improved shoulder, he was statutorily entitled to do so.
Under these facts, the Trooper could not have formed a reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, and therefore the
101. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
102. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
103. Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63–64.
104. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191.
105. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
106. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
107. See State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
108. Id. at 200.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 202.
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stop was unlawful. The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding
that driving on an improved shoulder requires more than the mere touch-
ing of the fog line.111
On appeal, the State argued that the fog line is part of the improved
shoulder, so that driving on the fog line is tantamount to driving on the
improved shoulder. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined to ad-
dress this question definitively.112 Instead, the court of criminal appeals
strictly circumscribed its analysis to the “core issue” of the case: the legal-
ity of the stop.113 The court of criminal appeals justified this course of
action as being consistent with other Fourth Amendment cases requiring
a reasonableness inquiry premised on the totality of the circumstances.114
Courts have consistently emphasized the “fact-specific nature of the rea-
sonableness inquiry,” resulting in narrowly-drawn Fourth Amendment
decisions.115
Citing judicial economy, the court of criminal appeals looked beyond
the lower court of appeals’s decision and opted to review the trial court’s
findings, asking whether these findings were supported by the record.116
The court of criminal appeals affirmed on three grounds. First, it held that
the record did not support a finding that Cortez crossed the fog line.117
Second, even if Cortez touched the fog line, this would not establish a
reasonable suspicion of driving on improved shoulder, which requires
that a driver “cross over the fog line.”118 That Cortez merely touched the
fog line did not equate to him crossing over it.119 And third, even if Cor-
tez “crossed over” the fog line, he was statutorily permitted to do so.120
The court of criminal appeals determined that Cortez’s conduct arguably
fell within two statutory exceptions allowing a driver to drive on an im-
proved shoulder both to “decelerate before making a right turn” and to
“allow another vehicle traveling faster to pass.”121 These circumstances
vitiated the Trooper’s reasonable suspicion for the stop, making the evi-
dence obtained from subsequent search inadmissible.122
2. Lerma v. State
In Lerma, a police officer stopped a car after observing a minor traffic
violation.123 During the stop, the officer observed passenger/appellant
111. Id. at 200.
112. Id. at 206.
113. Id. at 201.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ohio v. Robi-
nette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
116. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d at 200 (citing Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 691–92 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013)).
117. Id. at 204–05.
118. Id. at 205–06.
119. Id. at 205.
120. Id. at 207–08.
121. Id. at 208–09 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.058(a)(3), (5)).
122. Id. at 209.
123. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
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Ernesto Lerma acting nervously and attempting to access his pockets.124
Before running a license check of the driver, the officer asked Lerma to
exit the vehicle and began to interview him separately.125 Less than nine
minutes after the initial stop, Lerma attempted to flee the scene.126 Of-
ficers caught Lerma, searched him, and recovered a bag of synthetic mari-
juana and a “Tupperware bowl” containing seventeen crack cocaine
rocks.127 Lerma indicated that there was additional cocaine in the vehicle.
After a search of the car yielded nothing, the officer terminated the traf-
fic stop without issuing a citation to the driver.
Lerma moved to suppress the drug evidence, but the trial court denied
the motion without making any findings of fact.128 The Corpus Christi-
Edinburg Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion to justify either the stop or the prolonged in-
terview with Lerma.129 That court of appeals relied heavily on St. George
v. State, which had near-identical facts.130 In St. George, police officers
stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation.131 After the officers issued
a citation, they continued to speak with the car’s occupants. It was at that
point that the officers formed a reasonable suspicion that the passenger,
St. George, was engaged in criminal activity. The St. George court held
that, by issuing a citation to the driver, the officers signaled that the traf-
fic stop was complete.132 Because the traffic stop was complete, informa-
tion gathered after the stop could not create the reasonable suspicion
necessary to justify a prolonged detention.133
On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
and held that the detention was not unlawfully prolonged.134 Distinguish-
ing the case from St. George, the court of criminal appeals paid particular
attention to the order of events.135 In St. George, officers did not begin
questioning the appellant until after they had completed a computer
check on the driver and issued a citation. In contrast, the officer began
interviewing Lerma while the traffic stop was ongoing: he had yet to run a
license check on the driver, issue a citation, or otherwise complete the
traffic stop. Because the officer formed a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity during the stop, the prolonged detention was justified and the
resulting evidence was admissible.136
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 188.
127. Id. at 188–89.
128. Id. at 189.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 721–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
132. Id. at 726.
133. Id.
134. Lerma, 543. S.W.3d at 195.
135. Id. at 197.
136. Id.
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C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to obtain a warrant
before executing a search or seizure.137 A warrantless search is presump-
tively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.138 Because searches
and seizures implicate dearly-held rights, these exceptions are “jealously
and carefully drawn.”139 However, the courts have recognized important
exceptions to the warrant requirement.140 This subpart will examine de-
velopments in the jurisprudence of the exigent circumstances exception
and the automobile exception.
1. The Exigent Circumstances Exception—Garcia v. State
The “exigent circumstances” exception applies when “the exigencies of
the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.”141 Under this exception, a law enforcement officer may be justi-
fied in conducting a warrantless search to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence.142
This exception is frequently referenced in cases involving warrantless
blood draws because the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood
stream is often likened to the destruction of evidence.143 The U.S. Su-
preme Court recently addressed the exigent circumstances requirement
with regard to warrantless blood draws in Missouri v. McNeely.144 It clari-
fied that “while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may sup-
port a finding of exigency in a specific case . . . it does not do so
categorically.”145 Instead, exigency in the context of alcohol-related
blood draw cases should be informed by the totality circumstances and
analyzed under an objective standard of reasonableness.146 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that a Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness inquiry should be informed by the facts that were “available” to the
officer when he conducted the contested search.147
In State v. Garcia, appellee Joel Garcia was involved in a fatal car crash
137. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
138. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
139. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321, 328
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
140. See Jones, 357 U.S. at 449.
141. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459–60 (2011).
142. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013) (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 296 (1973); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion)).
143. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966).
144. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 144.
145. Id. at 156.
146. Id. at 148–49.
147. See Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Cole v. State, 490 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016)).
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and was taken to a hospital.148 Law-enforcement officers suspected that
Garcia was intoxicated and accompanied him.149 As they observed his
treatment, they expressed concern that he might receive an intravenous
treatment that would dilute blood-alcohol evidence.150 Officers took a
sample of his blood without a warrant.151 Garcia moved to suppress the
evidence gathered from the officers’ warrantless blood draw.152 The State
claimed that this action was necessitated by exigent circumstances.
At the suppression hearing, the trial judge made several oral and writ-
ten fact-findings regarding what the officers were “aware of” at the time
of the blood draw.153 Specifically, the trial judge emphasized that, at the
time the officers ordered the phlebotomist to take a sample of Garcia’s
blood, all medical treatment of Garcia had stopped.154 The trial judge
also found that the officers were aware of this historical fact at the time
they initiated the search.155 Together, these facts articulated that, at the
time of the blood draw, the officers knew there was no impending I.V., so
there was no risk that blood evidence would be destroyed and therefore
no exigency. In light of these circumstances, the trial court suppressed the
blood evidence.156 But the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded.157
On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted
that the trial judge’s findings of historical fact are entitled to deference if
they are supported by the record.158 While the record contained numer-
ous disputed facts, the court of criminal appeals acknowledged that the
trial judge is the trier of the facts and can accept or reject the testimony of
the witnesses when resolving these disputes.159 The trial judge has discre-
tion to make credibility determinations when reaching his decision.160
The court of criminal appeals explicitly rejected a per se rule that any
time a person suspected of committing a serious drunk-driving offense is
taken to a hospital for medical treatment, exigent circumstances will jus-
tify a warrantless search.161 Rather it opted to craft a deliberately narrow
decision, and determined that the trial judge acted within his discretion to
find that, at the time of the search, the officers were “collectively aware
of facts that would lead an objectively reasonable officer to conclude that




151. Id. at *2.
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153. Id.
154. Id. at *9.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *3.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *9.
159. Id. (citing Sawyers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 24, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), overruled on
other grounds by Watson v. State, 762 S.W.2d 591, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
160. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
161. Garcia, 2018 WL 6521579, at *12.
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any exigency presented by the possibility of medical care had passed.”162
2. The Automobile Exception—Marcopoulos v. State
Automobiles are treated differently than other property under search
and seizure law. Due to their uniquely public nature, automobiles carry a
reduced reasonable expectation of privacy.163 This lowered expectation
of privacy serves as the predicate for the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. Under the exception, if an automobile is readily
mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband,
then officers may search it without a warrant.164
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined the boundaries of the
“probable cause” requirement for the automobile exception in Marco-
poulos v. State.165 In Marcopoulos, an undercover police officer observed
appellant, Andreas Marcopoulos, enter a known narcotics establish-
ment.166 Three to five minutes later, he exited the building and drove
away.167 Officers noticed him making “furtive gestures” around the
center console.168 They initiated a stop, arrested Marcopoulos, and
searched the vehicle, discovering three “baggies” of cocaine.169 Marco-
poulos moved to suppress the drug evidence but the trial court denied his
motion. On appeal, the First Houston Court of Appeals upheld the search
under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.170
The court of criminal appeals granted Marcopoulos’s petition for dis-
cretionary review to address whether the facts gave rise to probable cause
that would satisfy the automobile exception.171 Probable cause exists
where the facts and circumstances known to law enforcement officers are
“sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”172 The court of
criminal appeals focused its analysis on the State’s two main grounds for
establishing probable cause: the furtive gestures made by Marcopoulos
prior to the search and his brief appearance at a known narcotics
establishment.173
While furtive gestures alone do not give rise to probable cause, such
gestures “coupled with reliable information or other suspicious circum-
162. Id. at *11.
163. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330,
335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
164. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264,
282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1037 (2009).
165. 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
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stances relating the suspect to the evidence of crime” can.174 The court of
criminal appeals noted two cases where furtive gestures coupled with
some concrete indicator of drug activity did establish probable cause, but
found them distinguishable.175 Instead it determined that, although
Marcopoulos made furtive movements before police stopped his vehicle
and had made a brief appearance at a known narcotics establishment, the
officers were not privy to the defendant’s business inside of the establish-
ment and did not witness the defendant participate in any transaction or
handle any drug paraphernalia.176 Lacking some concrete indicator of
drug activity, the circumstances did not rise to the level of probable cause
and the automobile exception could not justify the warrantless search.177
Notably, the court of criminal appeals repeatedly emphasized the close-
ness of the probable-cause question and the narrowness of the opinion,
and strictly conscribed the holding to the facts of the case.178
IV. CONCLUSION
While confessions jurisprudence remained largely unchanged during
the Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court made significant changes to
the Fourth Amendment principles associated with historical cell phone
location information. These changes will have resounding implications on
future search and seizure jurisprudence as Texas courts define the bound-
aries of the reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI. Additionally, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals narrowly refined other discrete search
and seizure topics, particularly the reasonable suspicion doctrine and the
exigent-circumstances and automobile exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
174. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 542 S.W.2d 420, 421–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).
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